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Abstract  
In 2008, the European Union was hit by the most severe financial downturn since the 
Great Recession of the 1930s. One of the major consequences of this phenomenon 
was the deterioration in the enjoyment of human rights, in particular economic and 
social rights. Whilst it is indisputable that the crisis itself was directly correlated to the 
erosion of such rights, the conditions attached to the loan agreements between 
defaulting countries and the three lending institutions, namely the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission, have 
negatively affected the rights under consideration. Loans came with strict austerity 
measures, such as public expenditure cuts in the realm of, inter alia, public services, 
benefits and social security. This paper considers the deterioration in the enjoyment of 
economic and social rights by Union inhabitants and particularly the anti-crisis 
strategy adopted by the European Union which, as will be demonstrated directly 
contributed to this deterioration. The stance of the three institutions was facilitated by 
the less than proactive, but improving, positioning of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in case-law which will be assessed. It must be noted that it is not the 
three institutions acting alone in this process; the Member States are the ones who 
agree to the loans and their conditions and implement austerity measures on the 
ground. However, as will be reflected, the practical role and actual input of the 
countries themselves in this procedure is limited. The central theoretical tenet of the 
paper is that the European Union is re-shifting its direction to the almost absolute 
adoption of an economic constitution, with little regard to its social counterpart. 
Within the aforementioned framework, this paper seeks to assess the status of 
economic and social rights in a crisis-hit Union, provide a theoretical explanation for 
this occurrence and put forth possibilities for positive change, placing the protection 
and promotion of economic and social rights at the heart of any responses to crisis as 
a method to ensure their sustainable protection effectively. 
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Introduction 
In 2008, the European Union was hit by the most severe financial downturn since the 
Great Recession of the 1930s.1 One of the major consequences of this phenomenon 
was the deterioration in the enjoyment of human rights, in particular economic and 
social rights. A 2012 report of the Directorate-General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion of the European Commission recognised that long-term 
unemployment associated with the crisis had reached such dire levels that ‘groups 
already at a heightened risk of poverty, such as young adults, children and to some 
extent migrants, are now experiencing an even worse situation’. 2  Whilst it is 
indisputable that the crisis itself was directly correlated to the erosion of such rights, 
the conditions attached to the loan agreements between defaulting countries and the 
three lending institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund, the European 
Central Bank and the European Commission, have negatively affected the rights 
under consideration.3 More specifically, loans came with strict austerity measures, 
such as public expenditure cuts in the realm of, inter alia, public services, benefits 
and social security. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
recognised the negative impact of austerity measures on the exercising of human 
rights.4 This situation, both in relation to the crisis itself and the strategies adopted to 
tackle it, has shaken the very foundations of the European Union. The financial crisis 
has come hand in hand with a social crisis in the form of the sharp fall in the standard 
of living of the Union’s inhabitants and, in particular, of vulnerable groups. For 
example, a 2016 report of the European Parliament presents findings which 
demonstrates that, since 2008, the number of people living in the European Union 
who are at risk of poverty or social exclusion has risen in the majority of Member 
States. Those found to be at most risk are women, children, youngsters, single parent 
families, the less educated and migrants. 5 Further, this crisis has been marked by a 
‘decimation of employees’ social rights, impoverishment among the lower and middle 
classes…[and]generalised precariousness.’ 6  The financial and social dismay has 
facilitated the development of a political crisis, as can be seen, for example, by the 
rise to power of Fidesz in Hungary and PiS in Poland, the electoral rise of far-right 
groups, such as Golden Dawn in Greece, which currently holds third place in 
parliament and the victory of nationalism at the latest European elections.7 Moreover, 
                                                        
1 Fundamental Rights Agency: ‘The European Union as a community of values: safeguarding 
fundamental rights in times of crisis’ (2013) 5. 
2 European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 
‘Employment and social developments in Europe 2012’ (2012).  
3 Viljam Engström, ‘The political economy of austerity and human rights law’ (2016) Institute for 
Human Rights Working Paper No. 1/2016, 1. 
4  Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The impact of austerity 
measures on economic, social and cultural rights’, E/2013/82, 7 May 2013, Council of Europe, 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Safeguarding human rights in times of economic crisis’, Issue Paper 
(2013) 2, 4 December 2013.   
5 European Parliament, ‘Poverty in the European Union: The crisis and its aftermath’ (March 2016: 
PE579:009), pg.1. 
6 Daniel Vaughan Whitehead, The European social model in crisis: Is Europe losing its soul? (eds. 
2015 Edward Elgar – ILO).  
 
7 2014 European Parliament elections: victories of parties such as France’s Front National (National 
Front), UKIP and Denmark’s Dansk Folkeparti (The Danish People’s Party),7 with the parties gaining 
24.86%7 26.77%7 and 26.60%7 of the vote respectively, finding themselves at the top of the list for 
their countries.7 Violent far-right parties are also part of the European Parliament with Golden Dawn 
receiving 9.39% of the vote and Hungary’s Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom receiving 14.67% of 
the vote in 2014 in third and second place respectively. 
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as pertinently argued, ‘one of the most evident effects of the economic crisis is that it 
has turned into a sort of existential crisis for the EU as a whole.’8 Although the 
economic, social, political and existential crisis of the EU are interrelated, this paper 
will focus solely on the social aspect of the crisis and namely the deterioration in the 
enjoyment of economic and social rights by Union inhabitants. As will be 
demonstrated in this paper, the lenders placed emphasis on finances and saving the 
Eurozone, with less regard to the social element of such measures. In fact, it could be 
argued that the anti-crisis strategy of the EU, namely loans (with strict conditions) 
granted to Member States, has been just as threatening to the European integration 
process, core Union values, such as solidarity, and the welfare of its inhabitants as the 
crisis itself, given that focus was placed absolutely on the restoration of the economy 
even if this meant disregard for the social objectives and provisions of the EU legal 
framework.9   Fitzpatrick holds that, particularly in the post-Lisbon era, the EU’s 
social constitution made up by the Charter, the social provisions of the treaties and the 
social acquis result in a strong argument against the disregard for social and economic 
rights in relation to the design and implementation of austerity measures as conditions 
for lending.10 As such, and ironically enough, the design and implementation of the 
anti-crisis strategy occurred during a time when human rights have been more 
recognised and embraced than ever and, more significantly, have taken place post-
Lisbon, a period during which there has been a ‘new impetus to a fundamental rights 
culture in the EU’s institutional structure.’11 The stance of the three institutions was 
facilitated by the less than proactive, but improving, positioning of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in case-law which will be assessed hereinafter. 
It must be noted that it is not solely the three institutions acting alone in this process; 
the Member States are the ones who agree to the loans and their conditions and 
implement austerity measures on the ground. However, as will be demonstrated in 
this paper, the practical role and actual input of the countries themselves in this 
procedure is limited. The situation described above demonstrates a shift to an 
economic constitution of the EU. The concept of an economic constitution was 
initially developed by the German ordoliberal school. More particularly, the Freiburg 
school founders developed the idea of the economic constitution, that being ‘the 
institutional framework within which economic activities take place.’12 As noted by 
Drexl, the concept of a European economic constitution is widely used in scholarly 
analysis of different languages of the EU.13 Amongst these scholars are Tuori and 
Tuori, who set the theoretical framework of their analysis of the Eurozone Crisis by 
relying on five constitutions. The economic constitution which has the economy as 
the main constitutional object, the juridical constitution which focuses on the legal 
system, the political constitution which embraces European polity as the object, the 
security constitution which looks at security risks and the social constitution which 
                                                        
8 Antonia Baraggia, ‘Conditionality measures within the euro area crisis: a challenge to the democratic 
principle?’  (2015) 4 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 2, 268. 
9  Francesco Costamanga, ‘Saving Europe 'under strict conditionality': A threat for EU social 
dimension?’ (2012) LPF Working Paper, no. 7, 1. 
10 Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Are the bailouts immune to EU social challenge because they are not EU law?’ 
(2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 3, 393. 
11  Fundamental Rights Agency: ‘The European Union as a community of values: safeguarding 
fundamental rights in times of crisis’ (2013) 7. 
12 Victor J. Vanberg, ‘The Freiburg school: Walter Eucken and ordoliberalism’ (2011 Walter Eucken 
Institute – Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 4/11) 7. 
13 Josef Drexl, ‘La constitution économique européenne – L'actualité du modèle ordolibéral’ (2011) 
15 Revue Internationale de Droit Economique 4, 419-454. 
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works on the social welfare of EU citizens.  The economic and social constitution and 
the comparison between the two will constitute the theoretical framework through 
which the treatment of social and economic rights in the financial crisis of the union 
shall be appraised in this working paper. The argument that the economic constitution 
has superseded the other constitutions will be demonstrated by three illustrations, 
namely, the austerity measures themselves, the passive stance of the CJEU and the 
fact that the European Parliament has no role in any austerity-related process. As 
such, the objectives of the paper are to assess the status of economic and social rights 
in a crisis-hit Union, provide a theoretical explanation for this occurrence and put 
forth possibilities for positive change, placing the protection and promotion of 
economic and social rights at the heart of any responses to crisis as a method to 
ensure their sustainable protection effectively.  
 
1. Economic and Social Rights: An Overview 
The protection of human rights, including economic and social rights, were not part of 
(what we now call) the European Union’s initial architecture. As reflected in the 
substance (and naming) of the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community, this was an economic project. European integration was equated to 
economic integration pursued through the establishment of a common market.  
However, some elements of social rights and social protection were incorporated in 
the Treaty of Rome. For example, Article 117 of Title III on Social Policy provides 
for the improvement of working conditions and standard of living for workers. 
Another example is Article 123 establishing the European Social Fund for improving 
employment opportunities and raising the standard of living of workers in the 
common market and these social rights were directly correlated with the common 
market and the free movement of workers. However, the architecture of the Union 
developed, as reflected in the change of name and, importantly in the developments of 
the Post-Lisbon era. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(Charter) is the central EU document that provides for human rights. Post-Lisbon, it 
enjoys legal status equivalent to treaties. Importantly, this document provides for civil 
and political rights as well as economic and social rights, significantly distinguishing 
it from the European Convention on Human Rights which focuses heavily on first 
generation rights.  Title II on Freedoms provides for both first and second generation 
rights, with the latter including the right to education (Article 14), freedom to choose 
an occupation and right to engage in work (Article 15) and right to property (Article 
17). Title II on Equality recognises the particular rights of groups, namely the elderly 
and children and underlines the equality between men and women. These are groups 
which, amongst others, have been particularly vulnerable in the crisis. In fact, Title IV 
of the Charter on Solidarity further develops the Union’s framework in relation to 
economic and social rights and is one of the most extensive parts, therein, setting out 
twelve articles on rights such as protection in the event of unjustified dismissal 
(Article 30), fair and just working conditions (Article 31), social security and 
assistance (Article 34) and health care (Article 35). Precisely half of the articles of 
this Title provide that they are recognised in accordance with national laws and 
practices, thereby, giving leeway to Member States in the framework of their 
conceptualisation and exercise. Although Article 52(6) holds that ‘full account shall 
be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter,’ there is no 
incorporation of this element in articles on civil and political rights or in the generic 
economic and social rights recognised in Title II. Either way, and notwithstanding 
reference to national practices in relation to Title IV, the Charter directly provides for 
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economic and social rights and, by constituting primary EU Law, imposes the 
obligation on the EU institutions and the EU Member States to respect these rights. 
Article 51 on the field of application holds that the Charter provisions are addressed 
to Union institutions with due regard to the principle of subsidiary and to Member 
States only when they are implementing Union Law. As will be discussed in section 
5, this Article was the one initially relied upon by the CJEU to wash its hands of any 
responsibilities vis-à-vis the deterioration of rights as a result of the anti-crisis strategy 
adopted.  
 
In addition to the Charter provisions and its post-Lisbon legal value, the human rights 
framework of the EU and, for purposes of this paper, the social landscape of the 
Union has been enhanced by other post-Lisbon mechanisms, such as Article 3(3) of 
the TEU which, within the framework of the internal market, refers to, inter alia, 
social progress, combatting of social exclusion and discrimination, promotion of 
social justice and protection. This article views the internal market as ‘an EU 
objective in its own right’ and, in addition, directly correlates the establishment of this 
market with the pursuit of the above objectives.14 Further, Article 9 of the TFEU 
provides that, in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall 
take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, 
adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, a high level of education 
and training and a high level of human health. In sum, particularly as a result of the 
developments brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has a human rights 
document which constitutes primary EU law and incorporates both civil and political 
rights and social and economic rights. In addition, Article 3(3) of the TEU and Article 
9 of the TFEU enhance the social geography of the Union and enhance the 
institutions’ obligations to consider and promote social and economic rights within 
the Union. Notwithstanding the new human rights impetus within the EU setting and 
the reality that human rights recognition is greater than ever before, human rights as a 
tenet covering social development as well through, for example, the right to work and 
social security, did not constitute a tenet in the design and implementation of anti-
crisis measures. As noted by Saiz, ‘despite the obvious human rights dimension of the 
crisis, human rights have barely figured in the diagnosis or prescriptions proposed by 
the international community.’15 As such, the complete disregard of human rights is 
not just bad practice but a breach of primary EU Law and renders the theoretical 
commitment of the EU to the promotion of social justice null and void. The dismal 
human face of the crisis that came about as a result of the crisis itself and the strict 
austerity measures, has been marked by poverty and social exclusion, particularly of 
vulnerable groups, thereby, limiting or even nullifying the enjoyment of rights 
provided for in the Charter. 16  Examples, for purposes of demonstrating the 
deterioration of the standard of living of persons living in the EU, and particularly 
those belonging to vulnerable groups, are many but two will be put forth for purposes 
of a brief illustration,. The European Federation of National Organisations working 
with the Homeless identified a systematic pattern of more homeless migrants due to 
                                                        
14 Aristea Koukiadaki, ‘Can the austerity measures be challenged in supranational Courts? The cases of 
Greece  and Portugal’  (2014) University of Manchester, An analysis for the ETUC, 20. 
15 Ignacio Saiz, ‘Rights in recession? Challenges for economic and social rights enforcement in times 
of Crisis’ (2009) 1 International Journal of Human Rights Practice, 280. 
16 Antonia Baraggia, ‘Conditionality measures within the euro area crisis: a challenge to the democratic 
principle?’  (2015) 4 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 2, 275. 
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welfare and housing cuts,17  whilst the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
noted that cuts in public expenditure are impacting disabled persons ‘in a particularly 
harsh way.’ 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Articles taken from the Charter on Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
Economic and social rights have been adversely impacted by the crisis itself and 
include, for example, the rise in unemployment which has led to, inter alia, a 
deterioration of the right to work and the right to an adequate standard of living. 
Economic and social rights have been further eroded by the anti-crisis response 
through the imposition of austerity measures by the ‘institutions’ and their adoption 
by the Member States. In this realm, two issues are of central importance to further 
understanding the status quo of economic and social rights in a crisis framework. 
Firstly, the relative ease in which the anti-crisis strategy managed to circumvent 
sincere consideration of economic and social rights and, secondly, the relative 
perplexity in demonstrating the violation of economic and social rights in the Union’s 
anti-crisis strategy.  One of the reasons that could explain both issues at least in part, 
could be the very nature of economic and social rights, their progression and the 
perceived non-justiciability of these rights. Article 2 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) holds that each State Party shall, to 
the maximum of its available resources, undertake steps ‘with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights.’ Therefore, the Covenant recognises 
that economic and social rights need time, progress and processes to be developed and 
achieved and that this achievement may be affected by economic factors. Moreover, it 
                                                        
17  Fundamental Rights Agency: ‘The European Union as a community of values: safeguarding 
fundamental rights in times of crisis’ (2013) 12. 
18 Ibid., 13. 
 
Human Rights Most at 
Risk  
Right to 
Work (Art. 
15) 
Social security 
and social 
assistance 
(Art.34) 
Right to 
health care 
(Art.35) 
Non-
discrimination 
(Art.21) 
Human 
Dignity 
(Art.1) 
Protection in the 
event of 
unjustified 
dismissal 
(Art.30) 
Fair and just 
working 
conditions 
(Art.31) 
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has been argued that the permissibility of retrogressive measures is ingrained in 
economic and social rights. More specifically, when the economy is in a bad state, 
‘retrogressive measures become an expression of the flexibility inherent in the idea of 
progressive achievement.’ 19  In relation to justiciability within the framework of 
austerity, the role of the judiciary in appraising austerity measures and their impact on 
economic and social rights has been discussed by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Koufaki and Adedy v Greece. There, the Court held that ‘…the decision to 
enact laws to balance State expenditure and revenue will commonly involve 
consideration of political, economic and social issues and the margin of appreciation 
available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies is a wide 
one.’ This makes it clear that the Court feels that it is beyond the scope of their 
mandate, as a judicial body, to make such political, economic and social decisions. In 
addition, the Court underlined that States Parties have ‘quite a wide margin of 
appreciation in regulating their social policy.’ 20 In addition, the Court underlined the 
principle of proportionality and its role in such policies. More particularly, the Court 
attached ‘particular weight to the reasons given by the Supreme Administrative Court’ 
which dismissed several arguments that the measures had breached the 
proportionality principle. The positions put forth by the Supreme Administrative 
Court included that the measures in question sought to consolidate the State’s 
finances in a sustainable manner. 21As such, the difficulty which lies in bringing 
economic and social rights before a court, the permissibility provided to States  
progressively to realise such rights, in line with their economic resources, the margin 
of appreciation granted to States to fulfil certain obligations as well as the principle of 
proportionality simply make this group of rights the weakest link.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework: A Dominant Economic Constitution?  
As noted in the introduction, the premise of this paper is that, as a means to tackle the 
crisis, the Union’s approach was a financial one, facilitated by the prioritisation of the 
EU’s economic constitution.  Tuori and Tuori propose five European constitutions, 
namely economic, juridical, political, security and social.22 The authors understand 
the European constitution as a ‘multi-dimensional and multi-temporal process of 
constitutionalisation where periods of dominance of a particular pacemaker 
constitution are distinguishable.’23 The temporality is affected by the particular period 
and setting of the EU at the time. For example, the Eurozone crisis has led to the 
prioritisation of the economic constitution with the economic constitution not 
approaching economic growth and social cohesion as interrelated and interdependent. 
This approach has facilitated the disregard for social and economic rights in the 
framework of the anti-crisis strategy and, as well as impacting the enjoyment of these 
rights by the inhabitants of the EU, in particular vulnerable groups, it places the 
European integration process and the values of the EU, as enshrined in Article 2 of 
the TEU, at risk. More particularly, it could be argued that the integration process 
itself is viewed from a merely financial and economic view. This demonstrates a 
regression to the economic integration model adopted by the Treaty of Rome, whilst 
the core European values of Article 2, and particularly human dignity and respect for 
                                                        
19  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 9 (The domestic 
application of the Covenant), para. 1. Also see General Comment No. 15 (Right to Water), para 45.   
20 Koufaki and Adedy v Greece, (ECHR 7 May 2013, app.nos. 57665/12, 57657/12) para.48.  
21 Ibid., para.44. 
22 Kaarlo Tuori & Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone crisis: a constitutional analysis (eds. Cambridge 2014) 4. 
23 Ibid., 10 
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human rights, have taken a back seat in the response to the crisis. Further, the 
principle of solidarity features in the Preamble of the TEU as well as other articles, 
such as Article 2, which provides that values such as the ones referred to above are 
common to the Member States in a society in which, inter alia, solidarity prevails and 
Article 3, which holds that the Union shall promote solidarity among Member States. 
Further, Article 120 of the TFEU, in the chapter on Economic Policy, stipulates that 
Member States shall ‘conduct their economic policies with a view to contributing to 
the achievement of the objectives of the Union, as defined in Article 3 of the Treaty 
on the European Union.’ Article 3 provides for, amongst others, the promotion of 
solidarity amongst Member States. Article 120 TFEU, therefore, sets out a distinct 
interrelation between the promotion of solidarity and economic policies as conducted 
by Member States (not EU institutions). The Preamble of the Charter holds that the 
Union is founded on, inter alia, the value of solidarity. The Charter contains a chapter 
entitled Solidarity which deals with a range of economic and social rights which were 
directly put at risk in the Union’s anti-crisis strategy. Article 51, therein, holds that the 
Charter’s provisions are addressed to its institutions as well as Member States (when 
they are implementing Union Law). As will be reflected in the case-law analysis, this 
article was of direct relevance to the subject under consideration and the mechanism 
through which the ‘institutions’ were found not to breach Charter provisions. 
Although solidarity is emphatic in treaties, it is not defined anywhere, therein, making 
its conceptualisation difficult but also rendering the determination of legal 
implications arising, thereof, almost impossible.  The only indicator that one may 
allude to is the fact that solidarity was the chosen name for the Charter’s provisions 
on, amongst others, work and social security conditions. This, at least, demonstrates a 
correlation between solidarity and the requirements of solidarity, on the one hand, and 
socio-economic development, cohesion and justice on the other. It would be hard to 
argue, as will be extrapolated on in the section below, that the Union’s anti-crisis 
strategy gave any due regard to such issues. This position is summed up in Mario 
Draghi’s statement that ‘we will do anything it takes to preserve the Euro.’ 24 
Essentially, this was the approach taken by the ‘institutions’, with the social 
constitution of the EU suffering not only as a result of the anti-strategy focus being on 
finances and the economy but, also, because the measures adopted within this strategy 
directly impact the social strata of the EU and, particularly, the social and economic 
rights of its inhabitants.  In a nutshell, it appears that the interests of the Union have 
regressed to the times of almost absolute prioritisation of economic integration. 
Related to this is that the anti-crisis strategy put forth by the ‘institutions’ and 
implemented by Member States which demonstrates that solidarity appears to be 
financial solidarity for purposes of keeping the Eurozone afloat.  
 
3. Towards an Economic Constitution? Part 1 - Austerity  
3.1 Austerity measures and their impact on social and economic rights: 
Austerity measures are a central tenet of the anti-crisis strategy adopted by the Union, 
given that they came as part and parcel of the loan granted to defaulting Member 
States as conditions for financing.  In 2010, EU Member States set up the European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and, in 2011, the European Financial 
                                                        
24 The Telegraph: ‘Debt crisis: Mario Draghi pledges to do 'whatever it takes' to save euro’ (2012) 
available at: < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9428894/Debt-crisis-Mario-Draghi-
pledges-to-do-whatever-it-takes-to-save-euro.html> [Accessed 30 June 2017]. 
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Stability Facility (EFSF) to provide future loans.25 In 2012, the European Stability 
Mechanism replaced these two and is an international financial institution established 
by the European Stability Treaty. The ESM ‘elude[s] any kind of democratic 
accountability…nor are its operations subject to constraints of the EU legal system.’26  
It aims at mobilising funding and providing stability support under ‘strict 
conditionality’ to the benefit of ESM members who are experiencing or threatened 
with severe financial difficulties if such funding and support are ‘indispensable to 
safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member 
States.’27 The conditionality referred to in the ESM Treaty has been attached to all 
lending processes during the crisis, constituting a ‘prominent feature’ 28  of these 
processes, notwithstanding the form or name of the lending institution or institutions. 
Austerity measures imposed included, enforced cuts in public expenditure in fields 
such as social security and access to health care. 29 One of the many examples of such 
cuts is illustrated in Council Decision 2011/734/EU which required, amongst others, a 
reduction in pay rates for overtime work, reduction in pharmaceutical expenditure by 
social security and freezing in the indexation of pensions. 30  As argued, ‘scant 
attention’31 was placed on the social implication of such measures, demonstrating the 
restricted focus adopted by the lenders to the crisis, with fiscal issues constituting 
their only priority. In 2011, in agreements with Ireland and Portugal, the lenders 
incorporated clauses on the social impact, noting that the lenders would ‘review the 
social impact of the agreed measures’ and recommend necessary corrections in order 
to ‘minimise harmful social impacts, particularly on the most vulnerable parts of the 
society.’32 However, this did not appear to bear too much fruit as it did not translate 
into practical assessment of impact. The anti-crisis strategy of the EU, as developed 
and facilitated in the framework of an economic constitution, was developed in the 
second decade of the 21st century, notwithstanding lessons learnt in lending processes 
to developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s by the World Bank and the IMF. 
After a series of studies conducted within this framework, the design of austerity 
measures should take into account the protection of vulnerable groups. 33 
Notwithstanding these clauses, the lenders still placed priority on finances at the 
expense of social issues.34 In fact, austerity measures are such a centrifugal part of the 
Union’s approach that Fitzgerald refers to them as a ‘new and highly significant 
source of social norms in the EU.’35 As well as directly damaging economic and 
social rights, austerity measures have also hampered the work and activity of human 
                                                        
25 Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Are the bailouts immune to EU social challenge because they are not EU law?’ 
(2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 3, 399. 
26 Bruno de Witte, ‘The European treaty amendment for the creation of a financial stability mechanism' 
(2011) 6 European Policy Analysis, 846. 
27 ESM Treaty (2012), Article 3. 
28  Francesco Costamanga, ‘Saving Europe 'under strict conditionality': a threat for EU social 
dimension?’ (2012) LPF Working Paper, no. 7, 6. 
29Ibid., 9 
30 Ibid., 10 
31 Ibid. 
32  Added to Council Implementing Decision 2011/77/EU (Article 3.9) and Council Implementing 
Decision 2011/344/EU (Article 3.10) concerning respectively Ireland and Portugal.  
33 Fundamental Rights Agency Working Paper, ‘Protecting rights during the economic crisis’ (2010) 
14. 
34  Francesco Costamanga, ‘Saving Europe 'under strict conditionality': a threat for EU social 
dimension?’ (2012) LPF Working Paper, no. 7, 11. 
35 Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Are the bailouts immune to EU social challenge because they are not EU law?’ 
(2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 3, 399. 
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rights institutions, such as Equality Bodies and civil society organisations,36 which 
subsequently affects the promotion and protection of, inter alia, economic and social 
rights. The negative impact of austerity measures on such institutions was also 
underlined by the Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights in his report on 
crisis hit countries, such as Cyprus, urging authorities to avoid budgetary cuts of 
human rights institutions.37 A worrying development in the international community, 
in relation to the acceptability of austerity measures was a letter dated 16 May 2012 
from the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to 
States parties to the ICESCR. The Chairperson reiterated the need to avoid taking 
decisions which may violate economic, social and cultural rights as this is contrary to 
their obligations under the Covenant and can also lead to social and political 
instability and the further marginalisation of vulnerable groups. The Chairperson 
defines vulnerable groups to include, amongst others, the poor, women, children, 
persons with disabilities, older persons, people with HIV/AIDS, indigenous people, 
ethnic minorities, migrants and refugees. However, the letter holds that the 
Committee ‘realises that some adjustments in the implementation of some Covenant 
rights are at times inevitable.’38 The letter refers to times of emergency but offers no 
definitional framework of what is to constitute an emergency.  After recognising the 
possibility that rights might have to be restricted in times of crisis, the Committee 
placed some, albeit generalised and abstract, safeguards into the conceptualisation of 
austerity measures, discussed in section 5.2. Thus, the Committee endorses the crisis 
narrative of necessity in the restriction of social and economic rights and inflates ‘the 
importance of neo-liberal market-based ideals.’ 39  This argument is also in direct 
opposition to previous positions of the Committee which reminded States that this 
genre of rights is even more, rather than less, significant in times of crisis.40  The 
letter, thus, has the capacity to alter the focus and importance on non-retrogression to 
a model of emergency justification of rights’ limitations.41  This was, therefore, a 
worrying development since the leading international institution on the promotion of 
economic, social and cultural rights acceded to the position that restriction of such 
rights is a necessary part of a State’s response to a crisis. This is even more worrying 
when taking into account the response of the EU to these rights in its anti-crisis 
strategy and the nature of economic and social rights as progressively realisable. 
These, taken together with the position adopted by the Committee in the single letter 
on this group of rights and the crisis, do not create a positive benchmark to be 
pursued.  
 
In its Resolution 1884 (2012), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
raised its concern that the ‘restrictive approaches currently pursued predominantly 
                                                        
36  Fundamental Rights Agency: ‘The European Union as a Community of values: safeguarding 
fundamental rights in times of crisis’ (2013) 31. 
37 Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe following his visit to 
Cyprus from 7-11 December 2015, para. 114. 
38 Letter dated 16 May 2012 addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights to States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, CESCR/49th/SP/MAB/SW.  
39 Ben T.C Warwick, 'Socio-economic rights during economic crises : a changed approach to 
non-retrogression.' (2015) 65 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 255. 
40 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 2: International technical 
assistance measures (UN Doc E/1990/23 1990). 
41 Ben T.C Warwick, 'Socio-economic rights during economic crises : a changed approach to 
non-retrogression.' (2015) 65 International and comparative law quarterly 1, 254. 
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based on budgetary cuts in social expenditure may not reach their objective of 
consolidating public budgets, but risk further deepening the crisis and undermining 
social rights as they mainly affect lower income classes and the most vulnerable 
categories of the population.’ The Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU (FRA) has 
argued that, depending on their design, austerity measures can ‘threaten to adversely 
affect lower-income and vulnerable groups.’ 42  The central tension is, therefore, 
between the focus on economic redevelopment through loan agreements that come 
with strict conditions without the analogous consideration on the damaging effect of 
the austerity measures on the social strata of the countries. What is far from a reality 
is the integration of social considerations in the form of the promotion and protection 
of social and economic rights as an avenue for fiscal regeneration. This position is in 
contravention to post-Lisbon Europe where provisions, such as Article 3 TEU, 
integrate the need to combat social exclusion and promote social justice and where 
Article 9 TFEU requires the Union to take into account requirements linked to, inter 
alia, social protection and the fight against social exclusion when designing and 
implementing its policies. In fact, these provisions become almost a hypocritical 
facade when considering the nature and effects of the austerity measures that have 
been linked to loans granted to defaulting countries with no demonstration of, at least, 
an effort, on the part of the ‘institutions’, to carry out a balancing exercise between 
financial and social considerations and a questionable ability of Member States to 
manoeuvre within this framework. In fact, the discrepancies between what is set out 
in Treaties in relation to social justice and economic and social rights, on the one 
hand, and the anti-crisis strategy enforced, on the other, reinforce the case for legally 
challenging austerity measures 43  It is, therefore, evident that ‘rapid fiscal 
consolidation and structural reform have created a cascade of social instructions’ 
44 which demonstrate a prioritisation of Europe’s economic rather than social 
constitution with the former not taking into account or embracing the social aspects 
and implications of its actions. However, notwithstanding the technical and 
conceptual validity of this argument, as will be demonstrated in section 5, the CJEU 
has been wary in its approach and involvement, at least initially.  However, in brief, 
and following Ledra Advertising discussed below, the functioning of the two EU 
institutions acting under the ESM can be brought before the CJEU and, as such, the 
status of the ESM as an international organisation does not relieve EU institutions 
from responsibility under EU law. In fact, as noted by Laulhé-Shaelou and Karatzia, 
Ledra Advertising was the first time that the CJEU both reviewed the actions of an 
EU institution under the ESM and ‘pronounced the applicability of the Charter to the 
EU institutions when they act outside the EU legal framework.’45  
 
3.2 Austerity measures: Beyond EU competences? 
In the above section, it was demonstrated that, immediately following the onset of the 
crisis, the EU rigidly embraced an economic constitution, without due regard for the 
requirements of its social counterpart. It must be emphasised that there exists no legal 
                                                        
42 Fundamental Rights Agency Working Paper, ‘Protecting rights during the economic crisis’ (2010) 
14. 
43 Aristea Koukiadaki, ‘Can the austerity measures be challenged in supranational courts? The cases of 
Greece and Portugal’ (2014) University of Manchester, An analysis for the ETUC, 21. 
44 Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Are the bailouts immune to EU social challenge because they are not EU law?’ 
(2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 3, 394. 
45 Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou & Anastasia Karatzia, ‘Some preliminary thoughts on the Cyprus bail-in 
litigation: a commentary on Mallis and Ledra’ (2017) European Law Review (forthcoming). 
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reason to prevent the equal development of social policy and economic policy as 
provided for by the Treaty on the European Union and further developed by the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. However, the reality is that there 
was no equality in the development of these policies, with the social counterpart 
remaining almost untouched. The lack of legal justification and the depiction of the 
EU as an entity with strong focus on economic elements demonstrate that this 
inequality stems from lack of political will for social consideration.46As a result, fiscal 
consolidation was the driver of anti-crisis strategies with the ‘institutions’ 
incorporating austerity measures which paid little or no attention to their social 
implications. Another indicator showing the shift to an economic constitution was the 
extended competences granted to the institutions. More particularly, proposed 
austerity measures impacted several aspects of, for example, welfare regimes of 
affected countries ‘in a way that seems to go far beyond the limits imposed by the 
Treaties to the EU capacity to intervene in this field.’47 In fact, in a post-Lisbon EU, 
Article 5 TEU reaffirmed the principle of conferral, whilst Article 153 TFEU reflects 
the limited scope of the Union in the framework of social policy by providing that the 
Union shall ‘support and complement’ the activities of Member States in social fields, 
such as social security and social protection of workers.’ Importantly, Article 153(4) 
provides that the provisions of the article shall not affect the right of Member States to 
define the fundamental principles of their social security systems and must not 
significantly affect the financial equilibrium thereof. Essentially, nowhere in the 
treaties can one find a legislative basis for the actions of these institutions in relation 
to the austerity measures they imposed on Member States and which directly limited 
social and economic rights and the social policy and justice objectives pursued in 
Article 153. This is notwithstanding that Article 13 (2) provides that each institution 
of the Union (including the European Commission and the European Central Bank) 
shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in 
conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them. In a 
nutshell, the ‘institutions’ encroached on themes and issues which are within the 
competence of Member States, rather than the EU, all in the name of its anti-crisis 
strategy and all in the framework of a hard-line economic constitution.   
 
In looking at the issue of economic integration as the paradigm of European 
solidarity, it is also necessary to consider the implications on Member States who are 
part of the Economic and Monetary Union and, particularly, their reduced leeway in 
tackling the crisis as a result of their membership thereto. For example, instruments to 
tackle national adjustments such as exchange rate and policy instruments would no 
longer be available for EMU members. This has led to the need for establishing fiscal 
adjustment mechanisms, would need to be created. 48  It must be noted that this paper 
does not look at whether or not the Union should have offered financial assistance to 
Member States but, rather, critically assesses the nature of this assistance in light of 
the very foundation of the Union which is no longer only economic strengthening of 
the Union but, also, the protection and promotion of social values which are necessary 
pre-requisites for a fair, just and functioning democracy. 
                                                        
46 This was one of the conclusions of a Jean Monnet Conference entitled ‘The sustainability of socio-
economic rights in times of crisis’ (3rd-4th July, UCLan Cyprus). 
47 Aristea Koukiadaki, ‘Can the austerity measures be challenged in supranational courts? The cases of 
Greece and Portugal’ (2014) University of Manchester, An analysis for the ETUC, 18. 
48 As noted in the Calmfors Report on the EMU and the advantages and disadvantages of joining a 
single currency available at: <http://uk.euabc.com/word/128>. 
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In light of the measures attached to loan agreements and the lack of national 
adjustment tools to EMU members, the next important question is what is the actual 
role of Member States who need to impose austerity measures on the ground? Did 
they and do they have leeway for avoiding their implementation, debating their 
content or reducing their social impact? Evidence shows that countries, such as 
Greece, had ‘little room for manoeuvre, questioning the idea of sole state 
responsibility for the measures’ 49given that the measures imposed were put forth as a 
condition and were designed and described in great detail. Therefore, framing the 
measures in such a way as to limit the involvement and reaction of Member States 
facilitated the central objective of the Union which was none other than fiscal 
consolidation as comprehended and pursued within the ambit of its economic 
constitution.  
 
3.3 Austerity Measures: The Role of Parliaments  
As noted by the FRA, ‘countries do much better in responding and dealing with 
economic crises when transparency in decision-making is promoted.’50 On a Member 
State level, national parliaments were ‘widely conceived as mere executors of policies 
imposed from the outside.’ 51  In its Resolution 1884 (2012), the Parliamentary 
Assembly underlined the need to maintain democratic legitimacy in relation to 
decisions taken within the anti-crisis framework by ‘preserving maximum possible 
discretion for national governments and other national democratically legitimated 
institutions.’ As noted by Scharpf, ‘European responses to the euro crisis have 
disabled national democratic legitimacy.’52This primarily resulted from the drastic 
reduction of Member State sovereignty in relation to the anti-crisis strategy. As such, 
democratic legitimacy of the implementation of austerity measures was drastically 
reduced. Further, the European Parliament is the only elected body of the European 
Union and notwithstanding its crucial role for upholding democracy within the Union, 
it has not been part of the anti-crisis strategy. For example, the European Parliament 
has been granted no powers within the European Stability Mechanism. In fact, after 
considering the draft of the Council Decision on the establishment of the ESM, the 
parliament put forth recommendations regarding amendments to Article 136 and, in 
particular, that the rules for conditionality should be determined by a regulation 
adopted under co-decision. 53  However, the recommendation was not taken into 
consideration by the European Council which, instead, enhanced the role of the 
unelected European Commission.  
 
In brief, national parliaments and the European parliament have been granted ‘but a 
peripheral position’54 in the tools, strategies and mechanisms adopted in the realm of 
                                                        
49 Viljam Engström ‘The political economy of austerity and human rights law’ (2016) Institute for 
Human Rights Working Paper No. 1/2016, 13. 
50 Fundamental Rights Agency Working Paper, ‘Protecting rights during the economic crisis’ (2010) 
14. 
51 Kaarlo Tuori & Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone crisis: a constitutional analysis (eds. Cambridge 2014) 
11. 
52 Ibid., 201 
53  European Parliament Resolution of 23 March 2011 on the Draft European Council Decision 
amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability 
mechanism for Member States whose currency is the euro [2011] P7_TA(2011)0103. 
54 Kaarlo Tuori & Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone crisis: a constitutional analysis (eds. Cambridge 2014) 
211. 
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the Union’s anti-crisis strategy.’ This occurred even though, post-Lisbon, the role of 
democracy and significance of transparency have been underlined and the powers of 
the European Parliament enhanced. Essentially, the anti-crisis strategy embraced,  a 
‘kind of executive federalism…that would provide the template for a post-democratic 
exercise of political authority.’ 55  Once again, the lack of democratic input on a 
national or European level reflects the prioritisation of the economic constitution, at 
the expense of the Union’s political constitution and with potential impact on social 
aspects given that no elected body was mandated to have a sincere and effective role 
in the design of the anti-crisis strategy. 
 
 
4. Towards an Economic Constitution? Part 2 – Judicial Protection  
In ascertaining whether the absolute prioritisation of the Union’s economic 
constitution is a reality, it is imperative to consider the issue of judicial protection in 
the framework of the Eurozone crisis and, in particular, the role of the CJEU in 
ensuring judicial protection. The central question to be responded to in this section is 
how the CJEU positions itself in the framework of this economic constitution where 
fiscal consolidation accompanied by strict conditionality was the ‘institutions’’ 
approach as facilitated by the aforementioned enhanced competences of the EU 
(regardless of Treaty limitations)  
 
4. 1 Article 263 TFEU: Threshold Obstacles 
Article 263 TFEU provides that the CJEU shall review the legality of legislative acts, 
acts of the Council, of the Commission and the European Central Bank, other than 
recommendations and opinions and acts of the European Parliament and the European 
Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. This is, therefore, the 
central framework through which the legality of measures adopted within the anti-
crisis strategy of the Union can be tackled. EU institutions, Member States and legal 
or natural persons can instigate proceedings under this article on grounds of lack of 
competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the 
Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application or misuse of powers. 
However, the threshold for individuals or groups to launch an action under this article 
is high. More particularly, the article provides that any natural or legal person may 
commence such proceedings against an act which is of ‘direct and individual concern 
to them.’ As noted by Fitzpatrick, it is ‘nigh on impossible’56 for parties who are 
likely to instigate such challenges, such as affected individuals in bailouts, trade 
Unions or civil society organisations, to meet the aforementioned procedural 
requirement. On the contrary, this article makes it much easier for Member States and 
EU institutions to launch such challenges since the only procedural requirement is a 
time limit. However, apart from the European Parliament, it is probably unlikely that 
Member States or other institutions will take such measures.57 
 
4.2 Position of the CJEU to crisis-related case-law 
                                                        
55 Jürgen Habermas, The crisis of the European Union: a response (Ciaran Cronin tr, Polity Press 
2012) 7. 
56 Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Are the bailouts immune to EU social challenge because they are not EU law?’ 
(2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 3, 394. 
57 Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Are the bailouts immune to EU social challenge because they are not EU law?’ 
(2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review 3, 344. 
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In the landmark case of Pringle, the CJEU was faced, inter alia, with the position that 
the ESM Treaty was incompatible with the general principle of effective judicial 
protection and the principle of legal certainty. To this end, an analysis of whether or 
not the ESM fell within the scope of the Charter was undertaken. Relevant to this was 
the meaning and relevance of Article 51 therein. Article 51(1) stipulates that the 
provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States, only when they are implementing Union law. Article 51(2) holds that 
the Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers 
of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and 
tasks as defined in the Treaties. The CJEU concluded that the Member States were not 
implementing Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter when 
they established the ESM and that the treaties do not confer any competence on the 
Union to establish such a mechanism. Moreover, it found that no obligations arise 
from the actions of EU institutions acting within the framework of the ESM as ‘the 
duties conferred on the Commission and ECB within the ESM Treaty…do not entail 
any power to make decisions of their own.’58 Further, the activities pursued by those 
two institutions within the ESM Treaty only commit the ESM. So, essentially, the 
CJEU views the ESM as an entity providing loans to Member States under strict 
conditionality, as an entity functioning outside EU law and, therefore, not bound by it. 
This is yet another indicator demonstrating the stark prioritisation of an economic 
constitution in the EU, with the Court essentially standing as a bystander to this 
procedure, notwithstanding the potential violations of EU law as a result of activities 
occurring with the ESM, its status and actions in relation to the Charter, but also in 
relation to treaty provisions, such as Article 263 on reviewing the legality of acts of 
the EU. A mirror approach of Pringle was adopted by the CJEU in Gauweiler.59 This 
case looked at the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions 
Programme and found them to be legal. This case is significant for the present 
discussion as it illustrates the paradigm of financial stability and does so by 
embracing Pringle principles. As argued, this case ‘builds on Pringle providing 
normative legitimization to the austerity model whilst granting the ECB a distinct role 
in monetary policy but also in shaping the general economic policy of the Union.’ 60 
Further, the position put forth in Pringle, regarding the scope of EU law in relation to 
the ESM, was also discussed in a series of Cyprus bank restructuring cases, such as 
(Mallis and others61), where the CJEU reiterated the Pringle position, making a 
parallel between the activities of the Commission and the ECB in the ESM and in the 
Eurogroup and noting that, even though these two participate in the Eurogroup 
meetings, this ‘cannot result in the statement at issue being considered to be the 
expression of a decision-making power of those two EU institutions.’ 62  It 
subsequently underlined that the Eurogroup is not an EU institution and its decisions 
cannot, therefore, undergo judicial review under Article 263 TFEU. On a more 
positive note regarding European responsibility in relation to anti-crisis strategies, the 
                                                        
58 Judgment of 27 November 2016, Pringle, C-370/12, EU C:2012:756, para.161. 
59 Judgment of 16 June 2015, Gauweiler, C-62/14, EU C:2015:400.  
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case of Ledra Advertising maintained the Pringle position that the ESM functioned 
outside the EU legal order but noted, importantly, that this ‘cannot prevent unlawful 
conduct linked…to the adoption of a memorandum of understanding on behalf of the 
ESM from being raised against the Commission and the ECB in an action for 
compensation…’63 In particular, it stressed the role of the Commission under Article 
17(1) in relation to promoting the Union’s interest. In conceptualising the role of the 
Commission in this manner and recognising its individual responsibility, 
notwithstanding that the ESM was considered to fall outside the ambit of EU law, the 
Court looked at whether the Commission contributed to the appellants’ right to 
property as provided for by the Charter. This was, therefore, a move in the direction 
of recognising responsibility of the EU institutions involved in anti-crisis activities, 
even though the final decision was to find no breach of Union Law. However, there is 
a clear shift in position, with the CJEU recognising the possibility of finding liability 
of EU institutions, such as the ESM, who act within ghost frameworks, 
notwithstanding that the ESM has been deemed to function outside the EU legal 
framework.  
 
Some further, relatively positive developments include Florescu, in which the CJEU 
was faced with the question of whether the Memorandum of Understanding under 
consideration can be regarded as an act of an EU institution within the meaning of 
Article 267 TFEU. The CJEU answered in the affirmative, finding that as ‘an act 
whose legal basis lies in the provision of EU Law…and concluded, in particular, by 
the European Union, represented by the Commission, the Memorandum of 
Understanding constitutes an act of an EU institution within the meaning of Article 
267(b) TFEU.64 In the recent Advocate General opinion in Associação Sindical dos 
Juízes Portugueses, 65  the referring court posed the question of whether national 
legislation is compatible with the principle of judicial independence, which, in its 
view, derives from Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter. The referring 
court held that the measures limiting expenditure were regulated and supervised by 
the EU institutions in the framework of financial assistance. As such, the Advocate 
General proposed that the CJEU should answer the question for a preliminary ruling.  
 
Therefore, threshold issues do remain as a result of the formulation of Article 263 
TFEU, which renders arduous the procedure to challenge the legality of a Union act 
by interested individuals and groups. In relation to the CJEU and its position vis-à-vis 
the role of the institutions involved in the anti-crisis strategy of the Union, there has 
been some gradual advancement in relation to the position and role adopted by the 
CJEU in relation to the responsibilities of EU institutions in the sphere of the anti-
crisis strategy.  Although, starting with Pringle, the CJEU kept out of the way of the 
institutions’ mandates and activities, this slowly changed with later cases, such as 
Ledra Advertising, which, notwithstanding the outcome of the case, could be 
considered as a catalyst for such change and a recognition that, notwithstanding the 
functioning of entities, such as the ESM, outside the EU framework, the obligations 
of individual EU institutions exist. So, while the argument of the CJEU ashing its 
hands of any responsibility with regards to the anti-crisis strategy of the Union and 
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the absolute prioritisation of the economic constitution could be put forth in, for 
example, Pringle, the Court has now recognised that, even if mechanisms do function 
outside the EU legal order, the EU institutions themselves are still obliged to function 
within that order. This is a positive development in ensuring some kind of checks and 
balances to the prioritisation of the economic constitution as the realm in which the 
crisis is tackled. Nevertheless, more rigorous and transparent monitoring could only 
be ensured if mechanisms, notably the ESM, were to be deemed to function in the EU 
order.  Only then can the judicial body of the Union be truly effective in monitoring 
the constitutional developments of the EU and stand as a robust obstacle to the 
absolute prioritisation of the economic constitution.  
 
5. Sustainability of Socio-Economic Rights in Times of Crises: Way Forward 
The current crisis, and the strategy adopted by the Union to tackle it, is very much 
founded on fiscal consolidation with little or no regard for the impact of its strategy 
on economic and social rights. On a normative level, the ease with which this became 
a reality reflects the ever existing discussions and positions regarding the nature of 
economic and social rights as, inter alia, progressively realisable with obstacles to 
their justiciability. As argued, tackling the very foundation of the normative 
conceptualisation of economic and social rights may be ‘overly optimistic.’66 Thus, 
with a view to ensuring a long-term and efficient protection of social and economic 
rights in all contexts and situations, the approach adopted by international institutions 
and countries to this generation of rights needs to be drastically modified and this 
paper puts forth some more practical ideas on how the sustainability of social and 
economic rights in a time of crisis can be promoted. These include the 
reconceptualisation of the interrelationship between economic and social rights and 
the crisis and the improvement of the infrastructure surrounding the need and 
implementation of austerity measures.  
 
5.1 Reconceptualising rights and the crisis: Long-term solutions 
To date, the anti-crisis strategy of the EU has been fiscal reconsolidation with little or 
no regard to social impact, with economic and social rights being treated literally as 
the poor relative of the Union’s approach. Indicative of this was the absence of any 
reference in the legal documents of the lenders to the Chapter on Solidarity of the 
Charter or the revised European Social Charter. There is one mention of the right to 
collective bargaining in the two-pack. This conspicuous lack of reference to relevant 
documents or themes is one of the indicators demonstrating the focus on the economic 
constitution without due regard to social aspects and, particularly, the protection of 
social and economic rights in the framework of the adopted austerity measures and 
the overall approach taken to the crisis. As argued, the current reality reflects that ‘the 
market-liberal economic reason has conspicuously overruled the European social 
constitution.’ 67  Another such indication was the negotiation process for the 
amendment of Article 136 TFEU, in which the European Parliament requested the 
insertion of the strict conditionality provision to be in accordance with the principles 
and objectives of the Union as laid down in treaties. This recommendation was 
rejected by the European Council. This rejection not only reflects the disregard of 
incorporating treaty obligations and Union interests, such as the promotion of 
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solidarity and non-discrimination, but also the ousting of the only elected institution 
of the Union in any anti-crisis process, as described in section 3.3 above. Given the 
almost absolute disregard of human rights in the realm of the European anti-crisis 
strategy, other institutions have attempted to assert their position, albeit with little 
success. The European Committee of Social rights, which monitors the revised 
European Charter of Social Rights has, for example, decided on several cases brought 
by Greek trade unions and civil society organisations. The decisions emanated from 
the premise that economic crises should not lead to a deterioration of economic and 
social rights. In one case, the Committee found that ‘governments are bound to take 
all necessary steps to ensure that the rights of the Charter are effectively guaranteed at 
a period of time when beneficiaries most need the protection.’68 This is a particularly 
significant position and very different to that put forth by the CESCR in its relevant 
letter insofar that it does not use the crisis as a framework potentially to justify 
restriction to this generation of rights but, rather, that it renders their protection even 
more significant. However, at the end of the day, organisations, such as the 
aforementioned Committee, can only provide criticism to States Parties without much 
repercussion if these States do not follow such criticism not only due to the power of 
the Committee itself but also due to the nature of State obligations which are to take 
steps, to a maximum of their available resources, progressively to realise the rights of 
the Covenant. Either way, the extent to which States Parties had practical leeway to 
manoeuvre in light of the strict conditions imposed by the lenders is doubtable.  
 
If the Union is to achieve sustainable solutions to the crisis and to the protection and 
promotion of economic and social rights, the latter need to be reconceptualised, more 
generally, but also within the framework of crisis responses. Economic and social 
rights must no longer be considered as competing interests and rights that necessarily 
have to be put aside for the greater good of fiscal revamping. To achieve this, the 
Union and its Member States must move away from the rhetoric of emergency and 
crisis which constitute the lens through which economic and social rights are 
perceived (if at all) in anti-crisis strategies. Moreover, as recommended by the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, in times of ‘unbridled economic 
liberalism,’ focus should be placed on protecting the general principles of a social 
market economy and strengthening the welfare state through an anthropocentric 
approach. 69 In reports on crisis-stricken countries, such as Cyprus, the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights underlined that emergency situations, such 
as a financial crisis, should not be a free pass for the automatic restriction of 
economic and social rights and the deterioration of the living conditions of vulnerable 
groups.70 However, the Commissioner did not just remain at this but developed other 
ideas in relation to economic and social rights in a crisis. More particularly, he 
suggested that such times should be viewed as ‘windows of opportunity to overhaul 
their national human rights protection systems and reorganise their administration in 
order to build or reinforce the efficiency of national social security systems, including 
social safety nets that should be operational when necessary.’ This position is miles 
away from the strategy of the Union, emanating from the conditions and requirements 
of an economic constitution and even more developed than the position of the 
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CESCR, as put forth in the letter discussed in section 3.1, which endorsed the 
potentially inevitable need to limit such rights in times of crisis and set out some 
abstract safeguards on how this must be done. If the EU is to adopt a sustainable 
protection framework for social and economic rights, which are the first victims in a 
crisis, the system and approach need to be re-designed. Economic development must 
not be seen as an opposite pursuit to social and economic rights but, instead, as part 
and parcel of an effective anti-crisis strategy achieving economic development 
through a human rights based approach. This approach was also called for by the 
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly which recommended a ‘profound 
reorientation of current austerity programmes, ending their quasi-exclusive focus on 
expenditure cuts in social areas.’ 71  The Assembly proposed moving away from 
cutting public expenditure and replacing it with raising taxes on higher income 
categories and property wealth. The Assembly also recognised that sustainable 
economic development needs sustainable solutions such as the creation of new 
employment opportunities, support of young people in transition from education to 
the labour market and more.72 This can facilitate sustainable economic development 
and, by default, place the promotion of economic and social rights at its epicentre. 
Through such approaches, there are no longer competing objectives of human rights 
promotion and economic development (as is the case today), no prioritisation of tasks 
and themes and no poor relatives.  
 
5.2 Reconceptualising rights and the crisis: Short-term solutions 
Being realistic on the functioning and approach of the EU today in relation to the 
crisis, the above ideas regarding how the crisis needs to be reconceived will take time 
and, importantly, political and institutional will. In the meantime, however, the 
continuum of an almost absolute economic constitution and the lack of regard of the 
measures on economic and social rights need to be tackled in a more immediate 
fashion. For this purpose, austerity measures need to be perceived as a necessary 
reality (at least for a while). To this end, such measures need to be properly 
conceptualised and applied. Firstly, the CESCR has noted, in abstract terms of course, 
that any deliberate retrogressive measures ‘would require the most careful 
consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the 
rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum 
available resources.’73 The letter of the CESCR, referred to in section 3.1, noted that 
measures must be temporary, implemented only during the crisis, be necessary and 
proportionate and not discriminatory, whilst the minimum core content of rights must 
be identified and protected at all times. No further extrapolation was given in relation 
to the substantial meaning of the safeguards.   
 
In addition, the obligations of involved parties need to be clarified. One of the central 
issues to have come about in the EU’s anti-crisis strategy has been the difficulty in the 
‘pinpointing of a violator and the assertion of responsibility.’74 So, whilst Member 
                                                        
71 Resolution 1884 (2012) austerity measures – a danger for democracy and social rights parliamentary 
assembly, para.6. 
72 Ibid., para.7. 
73 Letter dated 16 May 2012 addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights to States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, CESCR/49th/SP/MAB/SW. 
74 Viljam Engström ‘The political economy of austerity and human rights law’ (2016) Institute for 
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States themselves were part of the process, implementing the austerity measures on 
the ground and entering into agreements with the lenders in the first place, it was the 
lenders themselves who put forth strict conditionality requirements. Moreover, as 
discussed in section 3.3, national bodies, such as parliaments, appeared simply to be 
taking supra-national orders, rather than participating legitimately in any process. 
Therefore, who bears the responsibility or responsibilities for the deterioration of 
economic and social rights during this difficult period, both as this resulted from the 
crisis itself and, importantly, from the strategy subsequently adopted by the European 
Union? In the realm of crisis-related case-law, as with Ledra Advertising onwards, the 
CJEU recognised the obligation of the Union institutions, such as the European 
Commission, which, under Article 17 of the TEU, must promote the interests of the 
Union and ensure the application of the Treaties.  The above depicts an intricately 
complex situation where the role of Member States themselves is limited to the point 
where the involvement of nationally elected bodies can be considered a democratic 
facade, where mechanisms developed for lending purposes within the EU have been 
deemed to fall outside the EU legal order and where the realisation of the individual 
responsibilities of EU institutions in the process did not come about from the onset. 
All of this occurring with an economic constitution where fiscal reconsolidation is the 
key priority, with little or no regard to the socio-economic aspects of the adopted 
measures. Although the adoption of such a constitution has been made possible by the 
very perception of the nature of economic and social rights, which is tricky to change 
in the short-term, what can be developed is the role of national institutions in this 
process, granting them a genuine role in negotiating and subsequently implementing 
austerity measures as well as a reconceptualisation of the relationship between anti-
crisis mechanisms, notably the ESM (not just EU  institutions) in the EU legal order. 
If these two are achieved, then at least democratic legitimisation of measures will be 
realised and, therefore, better accepted by the countries involved as well as the 
legitimisation of the mechanisms themselves.  
 
Further, if austerity measures exist, as it is foreseen that they will exist considering 
the current anti-strategy approach of the Union, their impact needs to be properly 
assessed. As noted by the FRA, Member States and the EU should carry out pre and 
post assessment of their impact on the ground. 75 Importantly, the FRA underlined the 
need to incorporate human rights institutions in this assessment and noted that, for 
this purpose, such institutions should be strengthened so as to be able to conduct such 
activities. Impact assessment was also put forward as a necessary practice by the 
Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner who underlined that this process 
must be ‘transparent and inclusive’ and occur in cooperation with human rights 
institutions and civil society organisations. 76  When considering the impact of 
measures, both pre and post implementation, particular attention needs to be placed 
on the identification and protection of vulnerable groups. In this sphere, the Council 
of Europe Human Rights Commissioner suggested to crisis-stricken countries, such as 
Cyprus, the incorporation of social safety nets as part of the national social protection 
system in different forms such as cash, in kind, fee waivers on services and income 
support.77 In fact, this recommendation could be the way forward given that social 
                                                        
75 Fundamental Rights Agency Working Paper, ‘Protecting rights during the economic crisis’ (2010) 
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76 Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe following his visit to 
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77 Ibid., para.42. 
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competences essentially fall within the capacity of Member States. On a practical 
level, this can happen insofar as the lending institutions allow for fiscal leeway for the 
countries to manage such safety nets.  In this sense, social and economic rights could 
constitute the bridge between Member States and the European Union and constitute 
an effective realm in which the usurping of the EU’s constitutional arena by the 
economic constitution can be overturned.  
 
 
Conclusion  
This paper has focused on social and economic rights and the need to ensure the 
sustainable protection of such rights in a crisis. This focus emanates from the reality 
that economic and social rights are placed under direct threat by the crisis itself but 
also by austerity measures adopted by the EU to tackle the crisis. However, this by no 
means implies that other groups of rights, such as civil and political rights, are not 
affected by the crisis. Moreover, the effect of the crisis on the human rights 
framework of a nation and/or a region does not end with the effect on the generations 
of rights but also includes the rise in phenomena, such as racism and xenophobia, 
given that groups, such as refugees and asylum seekers are habitually presented by 
entities such as the media and political parties and perceived by the general public as, 
for example, benefit scroungers. Further, in an analysis of relevant Eurobarometres, it 
was demonstrated that xenophobia is higher amongst unemployed persons,78 thereby, 
reflecting the link between the impact of the crisis and the rise in intolerance. 
Europe’s history reflects how dire economic situations can lead to social exclusion 
and persecution (and in the case of, for example, the Second World War – 
extermination). A plethora of institutions such as the FRA, the OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and the European Council against Racism and Intolerance, 
have noted that groups such as migrants, minorities and other vulnerable groups 
become scapegoats in a time of crisis. 79  As such, tackling the crisis in a more 
sustainable manner, by placing social and economic rights at the epicentre of a 
strategy and moving away from the competitive attitude of economic prioritisation v. 
human rights, will not only benefit the rights themselves but will preserve the general 
spirit and values of the Union, as provided for by Article 2 TEU.  
 
In assessing the crisis that has hit the EU and, in particular, the anti-crisis strategy 
adopted by the institutions, it becomes apparent that an economic constitution is, as in 
the Rome Treaty era, governing the functioning of the Union without due regard for 
its social counterpart. This reinstatement of economic dominance has made silent 
treaty changes and has impacted the very foundations of the Union whichare no 
longer solely economic. For example, the above analysis demonstrates that the ever-
important Union value of solidarity has come to mean financial solidarity but, 
essentially, for non-solidarity purposes (i.e. non-defaulting countries safeguarding 
their own prosperity by facilitating the proper functioning of the Eurozone). In order 
to ensure the sustainability of economic and social rights and prevent the deterioration 
of other rights and the rise of aforementioned phenomena, the EU institutions and 
Member States need to adopt a responsible approach to this issue, working on an 
effective and well-rounded protection of social and economic rights within any anti-
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crisis strategy rather than viewing them as the first and easiest targets to facilitate 
fiscal consolidation. It is imperative to note that such changes need to be made from a 
centralised level (the EU) first as the lenders are the ones managing the process. 
Member States should also be active in assessing strategies, both pre and post 
implementation of any fiscal or social alterations on the ground, although sufficient 
leeway needs to be granted to them to do so. However, insofar as the economic 
constitution is the one monopolising Union strata, this is not a possibility because it 
is, essentially, the rise and prioritisation of this constitution that has led to the above-
described results. As such, shift needs to be made to place, at least, equal emphasis on 
the integration and protection of economic and social rights, as provided for in the 
treaties. What is significant is not to view the economic and social constitutions as 
competing but, rather, as synergies that need to be pursued together if sustainable 
fiscal consolidation that incorporates the human rights and human person element is 
to be achieved. The EU institutions functioning within the framework of anti-crisis 
activities do not enjoy immunity, with the CJEU having recognised that, although the 
ESM functions outside the European legal order, the institutions themselves do not. 
This is the first step in working towards the necessary structures of ensuring a proper 
conceptualisation and understanding of the social constitution of the EU which pre-
requires, for example, the respect of treaty articles, such as Article 2 of the TEU, and 
ensuring that the Commission is, under Article 17 of the TEU, a guardian of the 
Union’s interests and its values. Structural changes still need to be made if the social 
constitution is to be an adequate part of the Union’s reality, such as the increased role 
of elected entities at a national level but also at a European level, for purposes of 
democratic legitimacy.  
 
To date, social and economic rights have ‘proved to be rather toothless in resisting or 
redirecting’80 anti-crisis strategy such as spending cuts. If the scene is to alter, there 
needs to be a normative shift from the prioritisation of the economic constitution of 
the Union which has led to silent treaty changes and has had a dismal effect on the 
enjoyment of social and economic rights by inhabitants of the EU and, particularly the 
most vulnerable. In sum, normative strategic reconstruction of this constitution needs 
to be effectuated in addition to alterations such as increased monitoring of anti-crisis 
mechanisms, in a democratic and transparent way, and a rise in the involvement of 
national entities, in particular elected bodies. Moreover, there needs to be an absolute 
reconsideration of the relationship between a crisis and economic and social rights, 
moving far away from the emergency rhetoric to a constructive human rights based 
approach to the sustainable reconsolidation of an ill economy. Last, but not least, 
although there exist articles and analyses on the negative impact on the exercising of 
social and economic rights as a result of the Union’s crisis and its anti-crisis strategy, 
there is also the other worrying, yet significant, element that may initially be wrongly 
perceived as being too far-detached to be linked to the present discussion, namely the 
interrelation between austerity measures and, for example, mental health issues, 
substance abuse and suicide.81 On this note, if the Union is truly ‘a community based 
on the rule of law’82 and if the founding principles include those of solidarity and non-
discrimination, urgent steps in the above described direction need to be taken.  
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